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INTRODUCTION
Jon Snow, from the popular HBO fantasy drama, Game of Thrones, may
be the most popular bastard of the twenty-first century.1 Perhaps sadly, the
television show, comparable to the late medieval period in Europe,
particularly the fifteenth century, contains notions of illegitimacy that still
hold true today. Most notably, ³[b]astards are not allowed to inherit their
father¶s lands or titles, and have no claims to the privileges of their father¶s
House.´2 And while the common vernacular has moved away from the word
³bastard,´3 children born out of wedlock (also known as nonmarital or
illegitimate children) still face an uphill battle when it comes to proving
paternity for the purposes of intestate inheritance.4 If Snow stated he was
under the impression that six centuries later he would be treated as equally as
his brothers and sisters, one might reply ³you know nothing, Jon Snow.´5
The statutes and policies concerning rights of children born out of
wedlock are ever changing, usually restrictive, inconsistent from state to
state, and have historically disadvantaged minority children more than any
other group.6 The statistical truth is that children of color are far more likely
to be born out of wedlock than Caucasian children.7 In 1972, the United
1 ³I don¶t care if he¶s a bastard; Ned Stark¶s blood runs through his veins. He¶s my king, from this
day until his last day!´ Lady Lyanna Mormont, Game of Thrones: The Winds of Winter (HBO television
broadcast June 26, 2016). Snow is a prominent point of view character in the novels, and has been called
one of the author¶s ³finest creations´ and most popular characters by The New York Times. David Orr,
Dragons Ascendant: George R. R. Martin and the Rise of Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011).
2 Bastardy, GAME OF THRONES WIKI, http://gameofthrones.wikia.com/wiki/Bastardy (last visited
July 1, 2018).
3 Robert A. Brazener, Statute of Limitations in Illegitimacy or Bastardy Proceedings, 59 A.L.R.
3d 685 (1974).
4 John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v.
Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1969);
Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children,
63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 347 (2011).
5 Game of Thrones: Sons of the Harpy (HBO television broadcast May 3, 2015).
6 ³State laws of succession vary greatly in their treatment of illegitimates, the variance resting in
some cases on differences in policy judgments and in others on an apparent legislative unwillingness to
initiate changes in an area where pressure for change has not been intense.´ Note, The Rights of
Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337, 337±38 (1962). See generally, Julie E.
Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address Equal Protection Inheritance
Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 234 (2005); Leslie Joan Harris,
Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295
(2013); States with the Highest Number of Unwed Births, MOM.ME (May 8, 2013) [hereinafter Highest
Number
of
Unwed
Births],
https://mom.me/kids/7197-us-cities-highest-number-unwedbirths/item/10_168440029/.
7 Louis Jacobson, CNN’s Don Lemon Says More Than 72 Percent of African-American Births are
out of Wedlock, POLITIFACT (July 29, 2013, 6:48 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2013/jul/29/don-lemon/cnns-don-lemon-says-more-72-percent-african-americ/; Joyce
A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2010, NAT¶L VITAL STATS. REPS., AUG. 28, 2012, at 45.
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States Supreme Court noted the unfair history of illegitimacy jurisprudence
when it said ³[t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages
society¶s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage. . . . Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing
the illegitimate child is an ineffectual²as well as an unjust way²of
deterring the parent.´8
In the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court decided a multitude of
legitimacy cases, eventually concluding that legitimacy is a classification
subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.9 In most
of these cases, states proposed a rationale of discouraging so called illicit
behavior of bearing children out of wedlock.10 However, the Supreme Court,
at least in early cases regarding wrongful death claims of illegitimate
children, found that ³state[s] did not demonstrate any nexus between the
classifications at issue and their ability to discourage immoral behavior.´11
Still, parenthood was and is considered a question of law,12 not fact;
therefore, as statutes were struck down, they continued to be amended and
changed state by state.13
Florida is not immune to this history. ³The earliest legislation providing
a cause of action by which a mother could institute a child-support obligation
was called the Bastardy Act, enacted January 5, 1828.´14 Proceedings under
the Bastardy Act were considered quasi-criminal in nature until 1951.15
Although the Florida legal system has come a long way from quasi-criminal
bastardy proceedings, and the legislature has slowly created access for
children to adjudicate paternity, recent developments in the law have created
8
9

Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1651

(2015).
10 The State ³argued that since the legislature is dealing with µsin,¶ it can deal with it selectively
and is not compelled to adopt comprehensive or even consistent measures.´ Glona v. Am. Guarantee &
Liab. Ins., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968).
11 Baker, supra note 9, at 1653.
12 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 73, 78 (1968).
13 For example, Florida¶s main paternity statute, § 742.01, has been amended fourteen (14) times
since 1951. See FLA. STAT. § 742.01 (2017).
14
STEVEN SCOTT STEPHENS, 23 FLORIDA FAMILY LAW 5:2 (2017).
When any single woman who shall be pregnant or delivered of a child, who by law would be deemed and
held a bastard, shall make complaint, to the county judge or the justice of the peace of the district
where she may be so pregnant or delivered, and shall accuse any person of being the father of such
child, such justice shall issue a process [etc.] . . . .´
Bishop v. State ex rel. Garnette, 186 So. 413, 414 (Fla. 1939) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 5876 (1927); FLA.
STAT. § 3957 (1920)); see also Wall v. Johnson, 78 So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. 1955). Essentially, the same
statute was codified and recodified several times before landing in § 742.01 in 1941. See e.g., Fla. STAT.
§ 742.01 (repealed 1951); FLA. STAT. § 5876 (1927); FLA. STAT. § 3957 (1920); FLA. STAT. § 2080 (1892).
STEVEN SCOTT STEPHENS, 23 FLORIDA FAMILY LAW 5:2 n.5 (2017).
15 See STEVEN SCOTT STEPHENS, 23 FLORIDA FAMILY LAW 5:2 (2017).
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an insurmountable obstacle to access to the courts for a significant population
of the state.
Rose v. Sonson,16 holding an amendment to the out of wedlock statute
to be only prospective in application, and the statute of limitations it is based
upon, creates an inequitable result for a substantial portion of the population
of Florida. The case and the statute are, in effect, currently barring a majority
of adult children born out of wedlock from establishing paternity for the
purposes of intestate succession in probate proceedings if they have reached
the age of twenty-two prior to the death of their putative fathers.17 This
inequitable result requires remedy from the courts and/or the legislature in
order to provide equal protection to children born out of wedlock.18
The Third District¶s holding in Rose is too restrictive and will continue
to prejudice children born out of wedlock in their ability to access the courts
for the purpose of intestate succession for generations to come. 19 Therefore,
Rose should be reversed by the Supreme Court of Florida. In addition, the
Florida Legislature needs to correct the statute to expressly provide for
retroactive application, or provide a new cause of action to the class of
claimants whose claims were extinguished by the former statute of
limitations.20 Of course, this goal of equal access to the courts for children
born out of wedlock must be balanced with the State¶s legitimate interest in
the orderly descent of property, including the need for a well-defined rule,
ensuring notice to claimants, protecting the rights of creditors and future
owners of the estate¶s property, avoiding additional restrictions on rights of
inheritance than what already exists, and respecting finality in final
dispositions.21
Most likely, the Florida Supreme Court¶s hands are tied in its
interpretation of the 2009 amendment because of the rule that says an
intention to make a statute retroactive must be express on the part of the
legislature, which is not the case for this amendment.22 Although the
legislative history expresses an intention to overrule a case applying the old
16 Rose was the first case interpreting the effect of the 2009 amendment to section 732.108(2)(b)
of the Florida Statutes. Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct. 18,
2016), review denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017).
17 Juan C. Antúnez, 3d DCA: Should We Assume Most Paternity Actions in Probate are Now Time
PROB.
&
TR.
LITIG.
BLOG
(Sept.
12,
2016),
Barred?,
FLA.
https://www.flprobatelitigation.com/2016/09/articles/new-probate-cases/practice-procedure/3d-dcashould-we-assume-most-paternity-actions-in-probate-proceedings-are-now-time-barred/.
18 ³[T]he Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such µlegal¶
lines as it chooses.´ Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968).
19 Jacobson, supra note 7.
20 See generally In re Estate of Smith, 685 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1996).
21 Bilbrey v. Smithers, 937 S.W.2d 803, 808 (Tenn. 1996).
22 See Fitchner v. Lifesouth Cmty. Blood Ctrs., Inc., 88 So. 3d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
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statute of limitations, neither the face of the statute nor its legislative history
contain an express intention to apply the statute retroactively.23
There may be another approach to the same result that retroactive
application would have²that is, overruling the case currently on the books
that applied the statute of limitations in the first place which currently
contradicts the intention of the 2009 amendment. By overruling the case
mentioned in the legislative history,24 the Florida Supreme Court could
remove the statute of limitations without having to apply the amendment
retroactively. Both the Florida Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court
should act to fix the inequitable results of the 2009 amendment to, and
previous holdings interpreting, section 732.108(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes.
The legislature can provide a new cause of action, and the Court can overrule
its decision that applied the controversial statute of limitations in the 1990s.
In regard to this pressing issue, this Comment will first discuss the
history of paternity adjudications in Florida probate court, consider the
historical discriminatory effects of legitimacy statutes, and consider what
effect technological advances in DNA testing should have on legitimacy
policy. Next, this Comment will analyze the Third District¶s holding in Rose
v. Sonson, analyze the rules of construction regarding retroactivity of statutes
in Florida, compare the holding and statutes to other states¶ policies on time
limits to adjudicating paternity, and finally, provide suggestions to make the
rules less restrictive and more equitable.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. A Brief History of Paternity Adjudication for Intestate Succession
At common law, rules governing inheritance by children born out of
wedlock were archaic, referring to the children as bastards for ³bastardy´
proceedings.25 Children born out of wedlock had little to no rights because
most states followed the common law rule of nullius filius.26 Under nullius
filius, a child born out of wedlock was considered the child of no one.27
Therefore, the child was considered to lack ³heritable blood,´ and was unable
to inherit from either natural parent.28 Under the common law, putative
23

FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CIVIL JUSTICE & COURTS POLICY, STAFF ANALYSIS OF HB 599, at 1, 3

(2009).
24

Smith, 685 So. 2d at 1206.
E.W.H., Annotation, Inheritance by, from, or Through Illegitimate, 83 A.L.R. 1330 (1933).
26 See generally Metro. Life Ins. v. Thompson, 368 F.2d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 1966); In re Caldwell¶s
Estate, 247 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1971) (Ervin, J., dissenting); In re Estate of Ellis, 225 Iowa 1279, 1288 (1939).
27 Caldwell, 247 So. 2d at 5 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
28 Allen v. Harvey, 568 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tenn. 1978).
25

132

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 13:127

fathers had no duty or rights related to their children born out of wedlock.29
It was ³generally recognized that in the absence of any statute conferring
rights of inheritance upon them, illegitimate children [were] without capacity
to inherit from or through either parent.´30 Eventually, children born out of
wedlock were held to be protected by equal protection guarantees in regard
to benefits under the Social Security Act and access to support from putative
fathers.31 However, inheritance remained a right that could only be granted,
and subject to repeal, by statute.32
Florida courts began recognizing children born out of wedlock with the
Bastardy Act in 1828.33 The act was a child-support law, quasi-criminal in
nature.34 This law only applied to children born in Florida, and provided no
right to inherit for a child born out of wedlock.35 The state first allowed
nonmarital children to inherit from a parent as the natural kindred of the
mother in 1927.36 In 1933, under section 30 of the Probate Act, Florida started
allowing an illegitimate child to inherit from the father when the father
provided written acknowledgement of paternity.37 Then, in 1978, in In re
Burris Estate, former section 731.29 of the Florida Statutes (successor statute
of section 30) was held to be ³in violation of the equal protection clauses of
the state and federal constitutions´ because the statutory differentiation of
children on the basis of illegitimacy was not justified by recognized state
objectives.38

29
30
31
32

Ford v. Loeffler, 363 So. 2d 23, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
Caldwell, 247 So. 2d at 5 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70±71 (1968).
See generally Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337

(1962).
33

See Ex parte Hays, 6 So. 64 (Fla. 1889).
The alleged father was arrested, bonded, arraigned, and held for jury trial. See Bishop v. State
ex rel. Garnette, 186 So. 413, 413±14 (Fla. 1939); Ex parte Hayes, 6 So. 64, 64 (Fla. 1889). The quasicriminal nature of bastardy proceedings was still in effect in 1930. State v. Rowe, 128 So. 7, 8 (Fla. 1930);
Stephens, supra note 14, at § 5:2 n.2.
35 Campbell v. State, 59 So. 893, 893±94 (Fla. 1912).
36 In re Estate of Horne, 7 So. 2d 13, 15 (Fla. 1942).
37 Id. at 13; Florida Statutes § 731.29(1) mirrored the 1933 statute, providing that an illegitimate
child is an heir:
Every illegitimate child is an heir of his mother, and also of the person who, in writing, signed in the
presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father. Such illegitimate child shall
inherit from his mother and also, when so recognized, from his father, in the same manner as if the
child had been born in lawful wedlock. However, such illegitimate child does not represent his father
or mother by inheriting any part of the estate of the parents¶ kindred, either lineal or collateral, unless
his parents have intermarried, in which event such illegitimate child shall be deemed legitimate for
all purposes.
FLA. STAT. § 731.29(1) (repealed 1974).
38 In re Burris Estate, 361 So. 2d 152, 152, 154 (Fla. 1978).
34
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In In re Burris Estate, four children born out of wedlock claimed a right
to shares of the decedent¶s estate, despite failing to meet the statutory
requirement of paternity being acknowledged in writing by the putative father
while he was living.39 The trial court completed a full factual inquiry and
found that the claimants were the natural children of the decedent.40 Given
the circumstances of the case, the ³trial court held that section 731.29(1),
Florida Statutes (1973) was unconstitutional, in violation of the equal
protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.´41 The trial court
recognized a clear interest of the state in the orderly descent of the property
of its citizens, but found that such an interest did not justify the differentiation
based on illegitimacy.42 ³Therefore, the trial court concluded that the four
illegitimate children should share equally in the estate with the three
legitimate children of the deceased.´43
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.44 In its opinion, the
Court questioned whether denying a child born out of wedlock the right to
inherit from his father could be constitutional.45 To answer the question, the
Court adopted the test ³as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Trimble . . . an analysis of whether the statutory differentiation on the basis
of illegitimacy is justified by the promotion of recognized state objectives.´46
Applying this test, the court noted that the state¶s interest in the orderly
descent of property could justify a higher degree of proof for paternity than
maternity.47
However, the Court held that section 731.29(1) did not address
³standard of proof,´ but rather limited what kind of evidence could be used
to meet the heightened standard.48 The Court found that ³[e]ven proof beyond
a reasonable doubt would be insufficient unless the illegitimate child
introduced evidence of a written acknowledgement, signed by the natural
father in the presence of a competent witness.´49 Such a statute did not serve
the state¶s interest, but instead created an ³impenetrable barrier that works to
shield invidious discrimination.´50 Based on the foregoing, the Court held

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 153, 154.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 154.
In re Burris Estate, 361 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1978).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 152.
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that ³no sufficient reason ha[d] been asserted to justify th[e] . . . restrictions
on an illegitimate¶s right to inherit intestate property,´ and affirmed the trial
court¶s ruling of unconstitutionality.51
Before In re Estate of Burris was decided by the Supreme Court, section
731.29 was replaced by section 732.108, which took effect on January 1,
1976, and allowed ³an illegitimate child to take an intestate share if the
paternity of the child is adjudicated, either before or after the death of the
father.´52 Although this new right to adjudicate paternity after the death of
the putative father was a great leap forward for children born out of wedlock,
the statute still had problems. For example, until October 1986, ³only the
mother of a child born out of wedlock could bring suit to establish
paternity.´53 Putative children and fathers were unable to bring paternity
actions until section 742.011, amended in 1986, allowed the previously
barred parties to bring paternity actions.54
The access to the courts that the amendment to section 742.011 created
was then severely limited by the Florida Supreme Court in In re Estate of
Smith.55 There, the court applied section 95.11(3)(b), thus imposing a fouryear statute of limitations for paternity actions in probate proceedings,
beginning from the date that the putative child turned eighteen.56 In Smith, a
sixty-year-old brought a paternity action in probate court to assert her right
to intestate succession.57 The Court rejected the lower court¶s holding ³that
section 732.108(2)(b) creates a separate and distinct statutory cause of action
[for determining paternity in probate courts] which begins to run upon the
death of the putative father rather than when the child reaches the age of
majority.´58 Smith was denied the right to have her paternity adjudicated, as
was every other citizen of Florida who had reached the age of twenty-two,
even if the putative father had not yet died.59 Thus, the statute of limitations
was, in essence, a statute of repose, allowing a claim to extinguish before it
ever accrued upon the death of the putative father.60
51

Id.
Id. at 155±56; FLA. STAT. § 732.108 (1977).
53 Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct. 18, 2016), review
denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017); see FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1981).
54 Rose, 208 So. 3d at 136, 138.
55 In re Estate of Smith, 685 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 1996).
56 Id. at 1210; ³Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:
(3) Within four years.± (b) An action relating to the determination of paternity, with the time running from
the date the child reaches the age of majority . . . .´ FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(b) (1996).
57 Smith, 685 So. 2d at 1207.
58 Rose, 208 So. 3d at 138 (quoting Smith, 685 So. 2d at 1208).
59 Smith, 685 So. 2d at 1210.
60 ³A statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted (such
as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a
52
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In 2009, an amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) was passed expressly
stating that section 95.11(3)(b) (and Chapter 95 as a whole) ³shall not´ apply
to paternity actions in probate court.61 The Florida Staff Analysis further
states that ³[t]his bill overrules the holding in Estate v. Smith.´62 However,
neither the amended statute nor the legislative history made express mention
of the retroactivity of the amendment or the overruling of Smith.63 On
September 7, 2016, Florida¶s Third District Court of Appeal took up the issue
of retroactivity of the 2009 amendment in Rose v. Sonson.64
Stephen C. Rose was born out of wedlock on December 25, 1964. 65
Stephen¶s mother never tried to prove paternity during Rose¶s childhood
under section 742.011 of the Florida Statutes.66 In 1986, section 742.011 was
amended, allowing both putative children and putative fathers to bring
paternity actions.67 However, section 95.11(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes also
applied, imposing a four-year statute of limitations beginning on the date the
child reaches the age of majority. Rose did not bring his claim within the little
time he had left.68 Rose¶s father, Stephen Sonson, died intestate on June 21,
2012.69 Rose filed a counter-petition in probate court ³claiming to be a
surviving son of the decedent and therefore a rightful beneficiary of the
estate.´70 The trial court dismissed the counter petition, holding that:

resulting injury . . . ³ Statute of Repose, BLACK¶S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also 54 C.J.S.
Limitations of Actions § 47 (2017) (³A statute of repose . . . limits the time within which an action may be
brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action; the injury need not have occurred, much
less have been discovered. Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of
the claim, the period contained in a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of
whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.´).
61 ³The paternity of the father is established by an adjudication before or after the death of the
father. Chapter 95 shall not apply in determining heirs in a probate proceeding under this paragraph.´ FLA.
STAT. § 732.108(2)(b) (2009).
62 H.B. 599, 2009 H.R. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009).
63 House Bill 599 provides:
This bill overrules the holding in Estate v. Smith and provides that ch. 95, F.S., does not apply in
determining heirs in a probate proceeding. Therefore, this bill allows for a determination of paternity
to be made in a probate proceeding for the purpose of proving heirship, even if it is more than four
years after the date the child reaches majority. This change is limited to intestate succession.
Id.
64 Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct. 18, 2016), review
denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 137; see FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1981) (³Any woman who shall be pregnant or delivered
of a child may bring proceedings in the circuit court, in chancery, to determine the paternity of such
child.´).
67 Rose, 208 So. 3d at 138.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 137.
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(1) the 2009 amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) of the
Florida Statutes, which eliminated the four year statute of
limitations
previously
applicable
to
paternity
determinations, could not revive Rose¶s already
extinguished claim; (2) that the 2009 amendment to section
732.108(2)(b) did not apply retroactively because the Florida
Legislature did not express a clear intent it was to be so
applied; and (3) that any such retroactive application would
constitute a violation of the decedent¶s and of the copersonal representatives¶ due process rights because Rose¶s
claim was already extinguished.71
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the holdings of
the trial court, vastly restricting the application of the 2009 amendment to
section 732.108.72 If a person was twenty-two years or older in 2009, or
twenty-nine when Rose was decided, then that person is now legally unable
to adjudicate paternity in a Florida probate proceeding²which represents
about sixty-five percent of Florida¶s current population.73 So, while the 2009
amendment removing the four-year statute of limitations for paternity actions
in probate proceedings will certainly help Florida put its history of bastardy
proceedings and unfair treatment regarding the rights of children born out of
wedlock behind it, such a change may take multiple decades to truly have an
effect because of the amendment¶s failure to apply retroactively.
Finally, the law is currently unclear on the time limitations, if any, that
a person who was twenty-one or younger in 2009 has to file a paternity action
in probate court. A fair and reasonable time limitation can be established so
that the rights of children born out of wedlock can be balanced with the state¶s
interest in the orderly and timely descent of the property of its citizens. The
out of wedlock statute must serve the state¶s interest without creating an
³impenetrable barrier that works to shield invidious discrimination.´74

71

Id.
Id.
73 OFFICE OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, PERCENTAGE BY AGE GROUP: FLORIDA 4
(2015), http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/population-demographics/data/Pop_Census_Day.pdf; Antúnez,
supra note 17.
74 In re Burris Estate, 361 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1978) (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
771 (1977)).
72
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B. Other Considerations: Discriminatory Effect; Advanced
Technology
1. Discriminatory Effect
Although this Comment will not cover all the realms of important and
interesting topics that one could consider when assessing the laws that govern
inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock, it would be a disservice
not to mention the historical discriminatory effect that these laws have had.
Just as race has shaped so many areas of American society and law, family
law and inheritance in Florida and in the United States has not evolved in a
vacuum and has been affected by this history too.
Minorities, specifically African-Americans, are the group of people
most impacted by restrictive laws related to paternity adjudication in probate
court.75 More than seventy-two percent of children in the African-American
communities are born out of wedlock.76 Almost every other minority group
is above twenty-five percent.77 Further, Florida is one of the states with the
most births out of wedlock in the United States, with 206,786 nonmarital
births in Florida in 2011²forty percent of all births that year.78 Inevitably,
minorities will be discriminated against by the Rose holding.
Perhaps, not so inadvertently, society has cast a false lens upon fathers
of illegitimate children in minority communities.79 Although minority fathers
of children born out of wedlock are often keenly involved in raising their
children, the stereotype of the absent African-American (and minority) father
continues to be prevalent throughout modern society.80 Sadly, ³[f]or decades,
government officials have focused on paternal absence in African-American
families, treating µ[f]atherlessness . . . as a distinctly Black problem,¶ and
blaming absent fathers for many of the social ills plaguing African-American
communities²poverty, teen pregnancy, high delinquency and incarceration

75 Professor Harry Krause, who advocated for the rights of nonmarital children, argued that laws
discriminating against nonmarital children disproportionately impacted African-American children.
HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 259±60 (1971) (noting that 95.8% of
persons impacted by the statute at issue in Levy v. Louisiana were African-American).
76 Jacobson, supra note 7.
77 Id.
78 Highest Number of Unwed Births, supra note 6.
79 ³American public¶s image of a nonmarital child was that of an African-American child with a
welfare-dependent mother and an absent father.´ Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma,
and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 367±68 (2011).
80 See Dorothy Roberts, The Absent Black Father, in LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF
FATHERLESSNESS IN AMERICA 145±146 (Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 1998).
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rates, poor academic performance, and idleness.´81 This racially charged
history has created a system that punishes children for the so-called ³sins´ of
their fathers. Lack of empathy for the father has no doubt translated to a lack
of empathy for the child born out of wedlock.82 Society¶s condemnation of
the untraditional family has ended up harming the most innocent members of
society²children.83
One also must not overlook the great diversity that makes up nonmarital
children, because assuming that only poor, minority mothers and poor,
absent, minority fathers bear the majority of children out of wedlock would
be a grave mistake:
More than 50% of all nonmarital children today are born to
cohabiting couples, 15% of which marry within a year of the
child¶s birth. Another 14% are born to divorced women,
some of which have children from a previous marriage, and
22% are born to teenage mothers. While many nonmarital
children are born to low-income women, many others are
born to financially successful women. Nonmarital birth rates
also vary by race and ethnicity. Twenty-nine percent of
children born to white women in 2008 were nonmarital, as
were 53% of children born to Latinas, and 72% of children
born to African-American women.84
Future students, scholars, members of the Florida Legislature, judges,
and justices should not ignore these statistics and this history in their future
endeavors when analyzing and shaping the out of wedlock laws. No matter
society¶s current or future beliefs about parents having children out of
wedlock, those beliefs should not impose punishment upon children²
especially the historically disadvantaged²who are wholly innocent of their
parents¶ acts. As the Supreme Court said, ³no child is responsible for his birth

81 Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 993±94 (2006).
82 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (³The status of illegitimacy has
expressed through the ages society¶s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage.´); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (quoting Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La.
Ct. App. 1967) (³Denying illegitimate children the right to recover in such a case is actually based on
morals and general welfare because it discourages bringing children into the world out of wedlock.´)).
83 Traditionally, children who were conceived or born out of lawful wedlock were considered
illegitimate even if their parents later married. See John Witte, Jr., Ishmael’s Bane: The Sin and Crime of
Illegitimacy Reconsidered, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC¶Y 327, 334 (2003).
84 Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital
Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 369 (2011).
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and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual as well as an unjust way
of deterring the parent.´85
2. Advanced Technology Makes Claiming Paternity Easier Than
Ever
Although technology has made it easier than ever to prove paternity, one
must still balance this fact with the interest of distributing property in a timely
manner, and the unlikeliness and expense of getting DNA after burial. A
forever claim is not realistic, but there are more equitable timeframes for the
statute of limitations, based on availability of DNA evidence, that can be
implemented in Florida.
Before technology advanced to allow humans to test parentage by
scientific means, there existed the maxim mater semper certa est pater
semper incertus est, which translates as ³mother is always certain, and father
is always uncertain.´86 Today¶s technology has completely changed the
method and accuracy of how parentage is proven, almost to the point of
certainty:
The current state of paternity testing technology offers an
accurate, efficient, and relatively inexpensive means of
establishing paternity. DNA testing may be conducted on
relatively small samples of blood or cells. Tests kits
marketed to consumers are readily available online and in
local pharmacies at diverse price ranges. These at-home kits
typically utilize a buccal swab to collect cheek cells from
inside of the mouth. However, DNA collection need not be
restricted to blood samples and cheek cells. DNA also can
be extracted from hair and other biological material, with or
without the donor¶s consent or knowledge. The collected
cells are then sent to a laboratory for test results. Thus, the
current genetic tests are less expensive, less invasive, and
yield more accurate results.87

85 Weber, 406 U.S. at 175. For those wishing to explore the issue of discrimination against
minority children born out of wedlock further, there are various articles that cover the issue in depth. See,
e.g., Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address Equal Protection
Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 234 (2005); Leslie Joan
Harris, Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1295 (2013); Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 366-68 (2011).
86 Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe:” Disestablishment of Paternity,
48 AKRON L. REV. 263, 267 (2015).
87 Id. at 303±04.
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³[I]n In re Estate of Bonanno, the court held that posthumous genetic
test results could be admitted to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence
requirement of 4-1.2(a)(2)(C) in order to prove paternity in heirship
claims.´88 While the technology is available, procedural difficulties still
remain.89 For example, at what point does privacy and respect for the remains
of the deceased become an issue? One day after death? After burial?90
In Wingate v. Estate of Ryan, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had to
decide whether to allow a DNA test to be completed after the death of the
putative father.91 The plaintiff, Joanne Wingate, grew up believing that her
father was Willard Wingate.92 In fact, the plaintiff¶s father was John L. Ryan
(the decedent in the case), a close family friend.93 Just ten days before the
death of Ryan, the mother disclosed the truth to Wingate.94 ³The day after
Ryan¶s death, Joanne filed a claim under the Probate Code to establish that
she was an heir to Ryan¶s intestate estate,´ and ³obtained a court order
permitting a DNA test on blood and hair samples taken from Ryan before
embalming. The tests confirmed that Ryan was her biological father.´95
Wingate is a straightforward example of using DNA testing technology
after death, because the decedent¶s body was available to be tested prior to
embalming or burial.96 But what about disturbing the body or remains at a
time further removed from the date of death? Other countries have adopted
the practice, but there is no doubt that such a policy would need to be
88 In re Bonanno, 745 N.Y.S. 2d 813, 815 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2002); Megan Pandelton, Intestate
Inheritance Claim: Determining A Child’s Right to Inherit When Biological and Presumptive Paternity
Overlap, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2823, 2855 (2008). The Bonanno court noted that, despite the requirement
that genetic testing be administered during a putative father¶s lifetime under EPTL 4-1.2 (a)(2)(D), ³[t]here
is no basis in law or logic to exclude the results of posthumously conducted DNA tests on a decedent¶s
genetic material from the category of µclear and convincing¶ evidence under EPTL 4-1.2 (a)(2)(C).´
Bonanno, 745 N.Y.S. 2d at 815.
89 See In re Davis, 812 N.Y.S. 2d 543, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
90 This comment will not provide an opinion on the practice of disturbing the remains of a putative
father to establish paternity for the purposes of intestate succession, although it is not unheard of.
91 Wingate v. Estate of Ryan, 693 A.2d 457, 458±59 (N.J. 1997).
92 Id. at 459.
93 Disclosure of the relationship was embarrassing to the family:
According to Parsio [the mother], decedent acknowledged to her that he was plaintiff¶s biological
father on several occasions, but decedent repeatedly refused to publicly acknowledge that fact
because he and Parsio were not married, and such a revelation would cause embarrassment,
particularly in light of his Catholic faith. Parsio claims that she did not reveal decedent¶s paternity
because Ryan threatened to ³cut off ties,´ including financial support, to her and plaintiff.
Id.
94 Id.
95 Wingate, 693 A.2d at 459; Megan Pendleton, Intestate Inheritance Claims: Determining A
Child’s Right to Inherit When Biological and Presumptive Paternity Overlap, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2823,
2846 n.151 (2008).
96 Wingate, 693 A.2d at 459.
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balanced with the interest of privacy.97 In the case of Jäggi v. Switzerland,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had to consider whether the
remains of a putative father could be disturbed nearly thirty years after his
death, where the ³child´ was sixty-seven years old at the time of the ECHR¶s
judgment.98 One can infer that the ECHR¶s decision in favor of the applicant
was an affirmation of the practice of DNA testing, well after the death of a
putative father, depending on the factual circumstances.99
In Jäggi, the ECHR noted:
[People] seeking to establish the identity of their ascendants
have a vital interest . . . in receiving the information
necessary to uncover the truth . . . At the same time . . .
protection of third persons may preclude their being
compelled . . . for medical testing of any kind . . . . 100
³[C]onsideration should be given . . . to the applicant¶s right
to establish his parentage and . . . to the right of third parties
to the inviolability of the deceased¶s body, the right to
respect for the dead, and the public interest in preserving
legal certainty.´101
Ultimately, the ECHR awarded damages to the applicant from the state
for violating the applicant¶s rights by refusing DNA testing over a period of
nearly thirty years.102
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, an international treaty, and the Florida statutes regarding intestate
inheritance for children born out of wedlock are two very different beasts.
Nonetheless, when it comes to proving paternity with DNA, genetic testing
is too advanced to not consider its implications upon the issues addressed
here. Both children claiming the right to inheritance and decedent estates
have rights that must be balanced, and examples from other jurisdictions
(both domestic and international) can help to bridge the gap in this area of
law. Scientific advancements have made it so that a strict statute of
limitations may no longer make sense when justified by an interest in

97 See Jäggi v. Switzerland, App. No. 58757/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3±5 (2006),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-17360711820318&filename=003-1736071-1820318.pdf; Kroon v. Netherlands, App. No. 18535/91, Eur. Ct. H.R.
at 4±5 (1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57904.
98 Jäggi
v. Switzerland, App. No. 58757/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3 (2006),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-17360711820318&filename=003-1736071-1820318.pdf.
99 Id. at 7.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 9±10.
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certainty of parentage. Certainty can be achieved many years after death,
other considerations aside.
II. ANALYSIS
The Florida Legislature and/or Florida Supreme Court must provide a
means for claimants like Stephen Rose, who were older than twenty-two in
2009, an opportunity to claim their right to inherit after their father has died.
For those whose fathers have long passed with estates administered, the
state¶s interest in finality and the orderly descent of property is too strong to
justify opening a closed probate administration. However, where
administration has not begun, and a father is still living, it would be unfair to
deny a child born out of wedlock his or her right to access to the courts. It
seems there are three possible ways to provide for this intended purpose: (1)
for the Florida Legislature to amend the 2009 statute to include an express
intention of retroactivity; (2) for the Florida Supreme Court to expressly
overrule its holding in In re Estate of Smith (applying the statute of
limitations), instead adopting the First District Court of Appeal¶s opinion; or
(3) for the Florida Legislature to amend section 732.108(2)(b) to provide a
new cause of action for claimants similarly situated to Rose²provide a new
claim rather than revive the old one.
A. Retroactivity of Statutes
One of the three holdings of Rose v. Sonson was that ³the 2009
amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) did not apply retroactively because the
Florida Legislature did not express a clear intent it was to be so applied.´103
In Florida, for a statute to be applied retroactively, ³the Legislature must have
expressed its intention to apply the law retroactively in language that is µtoo
clear and explicit to admit of reasonable doubt.¶´104 One important reason for
this requirement of an express intention is the need for checks and balances,
and the policy against the judiciary infringing upon the legislature by creating
law.105 There is a distinction between a substantive statute and a procedural
103 Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct. 18, 2016), review
denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017).
104 Fitchner v. Lifesouth Cmty. Blood Ctrs., Inc., 88 So. 3d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting
Trs. of Tufts Coll. v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc., 275 So. 2d 521, 524 (Fla. 1973)); see also Basel v. McFarland
& Sons, Inc., 815 So. 2d 687, 692±93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Metro. Dade Cty. v. Chase Fed. Hous.
Corp., 737 So. 2d 494, 499 (Fla. 1999).
105 In Fleeman v. Case, the Florida Supreme Court stated:
[I]f we insist that a declaration of retroactive application be made expressly in the legislation under
review[,] . . . the forward or backward reach of proposed laws is irrevocably assigned in the forum
best suited to determine that issue, and the judiciary is limited only to determining in appropriate
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or remedial statute, so that ³[t]he general rule is that a substantive statute will
not operate retrospectively absent clear legislative intent to the contrary but
that a procedural or remedial statute is to operate retrospectively and should
be applied to pending cases in order to fully effectuate the Legislation¶s
intended purpose.´106
Although, in Rose, the Third District Court of Appeal treated the
amendment as a substantive statute because it considers heirs to have a vested
interest in the estate of the decedent, it can be argued that the amendment to
section 732.108(2)(b) is actually remedial or procedural. ³Remedial statutes
operate to further a remedy or confirm rights that already exist, and a
procedural law provides the means and methods for the application and
enforcement of existing duties and rights.´107 The amendment at issue does
not create or take away a right, it simply confirms that right by removing an
unconstitutional bar to asserting the right²the statute of limitations that
allows claims to be lost before they ever accrue.108
Difficulty arises even if accepting the amendment as procedural or
remedial because a statute of limitations does provide a defense for a
defendant to assert, providing finality and predictability to the defendant.109
That defense may be considered a right in and of itself. Therefore, the
amendment may be ³an act designed to serve a remedial purpose,´ but cannot
be applied retroactively because ³it is clear that doing so would attach new
legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.´110 Applying
the amendment retroactively poses many challenges, including this
substantive versus remedial/procedural issue, as well as the legislature¶s
failure to address the need for an express intention of retroactivity within the
face of the statute.111

cases whether the expressed retroactive application of the law collides with any overriding
constitutional provision.
342 So. 2d 815, 817±18 (Fla. 1976).
106 JOHN J. DVORSKE ET AL., 48A FLORIDA JURISPRUDENCE § 107 (2d. ed. 2017).
107 Id.
108 In re Estate of Smith, 685 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1996); see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(b) (2017),
providing: ³Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (3) Within
four years . . . (b) An action relating to the determination of paternity, with the time running from the date
the child reaches the age of majority.´
109 ³The statute of limitations is a defense that is ordinarily asserted by the defendant to defeat an
action brought against him after the appropriate time has elapsed.´ Statute of Limitations, LEGALDICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/statute+of+limitations.
110 DVORSKE ET AL., supra note 106; see also Morris v. Swanson, 940 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006).
111 ³Florida legislation is presumed to operate prospectively unless there exists a showing on the
face of the law that retroactive application is intended.´ DVORSKE ET AL., supra note 106 § 106; see also
Yamaha Parts Distribs. Inc. v. Ehrman, 316 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1975).
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Even if the legislature had shown an express intention of retroactivity
within the statute, a retroactive statute cannot ³breathe new life into [a]
previously extinguished claim.´112 The problem that Rose (and other similar
cases) poses to retroactive application of the 2009 amendment is that
³retroactive application would constitute a violation of the decedent¶s and of
the [personal] representatives¶ due process rights because Rose¶s claim was
already extinguished.´113 ³Once the defense of the statute of limitations has
accrued, it is protected as a property interest just as the plaintiff¶s right to
commence an action is a valid and protected property interest.´114 ³Statutes
that relate only to procedure or remedy generally apply to all pending cases,
but a substantive law that interferes with vested rights will not be applied
retrospectively.´115
However, the question must be posed²are the rights truly vested if they
were based on an unconstitutional application of a statute of limitations? And,
does the due process concern of the so-called ³vested rights´ of the decedent
and personal representative trump the due process and equal protection
concerns that arise from extinguishing the illegitimate child¶s access to court
before his or her claim has accrued?116 To answer this question, one may look
to the wisdom of another jurisdiction with substantially similar rules.
In 1981, the Court of Appeal of Tennessee, in Thompson v. Coates, dealt
with a similar statute to Florida¶s section 732.108(2)(b).117 Like section
732.108(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, Tennessee¶s statute allows for
adjudication to be proven after the death of the putative father.118 In
Thompson, an action was instituted to establish that the plaintiff was the
illegitimate child of the individual whose estate the defendant was
administering.119 The defendants argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff was
barred from making a claim to inheritance because the property right had

112 Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct. 18, 2016), review
denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017).
113 Id.
114 Wiley v. Roof, 641 So. 2d 66, 68 (Fla.1994).
115 Morris, 940 So. 2d at 1256.
116 See Baker, supra note 9, at 1681 (³Intestacy statutes, by their nature, implicate the two strands
of equal protection²fundamental rights and suspect classification²that trigger judicial scrutiny. The
purpose of intestacy statutes is to label as family, and therefore takers, some list of people at the expense
of others. That is what intestacy statutes do: they define family. Then, intestacy statutes discriminate²on
purpose²between family members.´).
117 Thompson v. Coates, 627 S.W.2d 376, 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2105 (1981) (³Parent and child relationship: µfor purposes of intestate succession, person is a child of the
father the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father or is established
thereafter by clear and convincing proof.¶´)
118 TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105 (1981).
119 Thompson, 627 S.W.2d at 376.
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³finally vested´ upon the death of the decedent.120 This was a due process
argument for the defendants¶ property interest, much like the court in Rose
acknowledged and held in favor of.121
The court in Tennessee differed from the Third District in Rose,
correctly noting that while the defendant in Thompson had a valid property
interest, it was not ³finally vested.´122 The Court of Appeal found this lack of
a finally-vested property interest to be evidenced by the fact that ³upon the
death of a decedent [there] is the authority given the representative of an
estate to utilize the real property to discharge decedent¶s obligations.´123 In
other words, the property interest is not finally or fully vested until the
probate administration is completed. The estate¶s property is subject to
claims of creditors, allowable expenses of the decedent, pretermitted spouse
and pretermitted child claims, claims for an elective share, will contests, and
other similar matters. Until all these issues are resolved, no property interest
is truly, fully vested. This delay in the final vesting of the rights of inheritance
in the other heirs of the decedent is consistent with the delay prompted by the
filing of claims by actual creditors, those seeking to assert or contest a will,
etcetera.124
If one compares the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Tennessee in
Thompson, to hold in favor of the child born out of wedlock, with the
reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeal in Florida in Rose, to hold
against the child born out of wedlock, the Tennessee explanation is more
logical and equitable. While it is true that Sonson¶s estate, personal
representative, and legitimate children had an interest in the property, so too
did Rose in claiming the property as the alleged heir of his father.125 To rely
on the restrictive, and possibly unconstitutional, statute of limitations in cases
like this ³would effectively bar illegitimate children from establishing
paternity after the death of the father.´126
Such a result would be in contravention to the unambiguous effect of
the statute and inequitable where the opposing property interest would still
be subject to other claims, such as creditors. If the Florida Supreme Court
and the legislature adopt the view that no rights are fully vested until probate
proceedings are closed, then there would seem to be no constitutional
problem posed by allowing the Florida Legislature to amend section
120

Id. at 381.
Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct. 18, 2016), review
denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017).
122 Thompson, 627 S.W.2d at 38.
123 Id.
124 Glanton v. Lord, 183 S.W.3d 391, 399 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
125 Rose, 208 So. 3d at 136.
126 Thompson v. Coates, 627 S.W.2d 376, 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
121
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732.108(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes once more to expressly provide for
retrospective application of the 2009 amendment.
The Third District¶s holding that ³any such retroactive application
would constitute a violation of the decedent¶s and of the co-personal
representatives¶ due process rights because Rose¶s claim was already
extinguished´127 is wrong because the decedent and co-representative did not
have vested property rights, and still had the opportunity to defend their
claims from the alleged heir in probate proceedings. If anyone¶s due process
rights would be infringed by not allowing the 2009 amendment to be
retroactive, it would be the illegitimate child because strictly prospective
application would ³effectively bar illegitimate children from establishing
paternity after the death of the father.´128
B. Reverse to Revive—Goodbye In re Estate of Smith
Even if one were to accept that ³retroactive application would constitute
a violation of the decedent¶s and of the co-personal representatives¶ due
process rights because Rose¶s claim was already extinguished,´129 and that
the legislature could not make the 2009 amendment retroactive, the Florida
Supreme Court may have a judicial lane around this legislative limitation²
overruling precedent. The four-year statute of limitations does not expressly
apply to paternity claims for intestate succession after the death of the
putative father.130 Instead, the limitation was imposed upon the claimant (and
future claimants) by the Florida Supreme Court in In re Estate of Smith.131 If
the Court renounces its decision in Smith and adopts a new view, then that
holding, rather than the statute, could apply retroactively.
There is at least one similar example of a limitation being ruled
unconstitutional such that a holding was then applied retroactively.132 In
Black v. Nesmith, a married mother filed a complaint to determine paternity
against the father, who was not the husband.133 The father moved to dismiss
because the controlling statute when the child was born only allowed for the

127 Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct. 18, 2016), review
denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017).
128 Thompson, 627 S.W.2d at 381.
129 Rose, 208 So. 3d at 138.
130 FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(b) (2017).
131 In re Estate of Smith, 685 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 1996).
132 See, e.g., Black v. Nesmith, 475 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
133 Id.
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complainant to be unmarried, and the mother was married.134 Although the
statute was later amended (prior to the mother¶s action) to eliminate the term
³unmarried,´ the father argued that retroactive application of the amendment
to permit the suit against him would be unconstitutional because his property
rights were vested under the previous statute¶s limitations.135 The court
disagreed, noting that although the Florida Legislature did not make an
express intention of retroactivity, ³[t]he general rule regarding retroactivity
of a decision of a court of last resort overruling a decision is that such a
decision is retrospective as well as prospective in its operation unless
declared by the opinion to have a prospective effect only.´136
Because the limitation imposed by the word ³unmarried´ was deemed
unconstitutional in a previous case, Gammon v. Cobb, the Court in Black
concluded that the Gammon holding could be applied retroactively even
though the legislative amendment removing the requirement that a claimant
not be married was not expressly retroactive.137 Further, the Court noted that
³[s]ection 742.011 is intended solely to protect the rights of illegitimate
children and to insure that all children are supported by their natural fathers
. . . Given this policy, we find it unlikely that the Legislature intended to
create a right in defendants to avoid their obligations´ by using the limitations
imposed within the statute to their advantage.138 The married mother in Black
could maintain her paternity action against the father based on the
retroactivity of Gammon, even though at time of the child¶s birth the statute
limited such actions to unmarried women.139
Applying Black to section 732.108(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, a
similar result can be reached if the Florida Supreme Court elects to overrule
its 1996 decision of In re Estate of Smith, and adopts the First District Court
of Appeal¶s decision instead.140 While the amendment to section
732.108(2)(b) does not expressly state an intention to make the new rule
retroactive, the legislative history of the amendment sheds light upon the

134 ³Any unmarried woman who shall be pregnant or delivered of a child may bring proceedings
in the circuit court, in chancery, to determine the paternity of such child.´ Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. §
742.011 (1969)).
135 Black, 475 So. 2d at 965.
136 Id. at 964 (citing Dep¶t of Revenue v. Anderson, 389 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980));
Int¶l Studio Apartment Ass¶n, Inc. v. Lockwood, 421 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
137 Id. at 964 (citing Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1976)).
138 Black, 475 So. 2d at 964.
139 Id.
140 In re Estate of Smith, 640 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), approved in part and
remanded sub nom.; In re Estate of Charles W. Smith; Dale S. Wilson v. Shirley I. Scruggs; Dale S. Wilson
v. Shirley I. Scruggs, No. 84,385, 1995 WL 689549 (Fla. Nov. 22, 1995), opinion withdrawn and
superseded on reh¶g sub nom. In re Estate of Smith, 685 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1996), and decision quashed,
685 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1996).
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legislature¶s intent. Per the Florida Staff Analysis, reviewing the amendment,
³[t]his bill overrules the holding in Estate v. Smith [same as In re Estate of
Smith] and provides that ch. 95, F.S., does not apply in determining heirs in
a probate proceeding.´141
The amendment did not say that section 95.11(3)(b) no longer applies
in determining heirs in a probate proceeding.142 Instead, it states that the
statute does not apply.143 Such universal language independent from timing
of the claim, coupled with the express intention to overrule In re Estate of
Smith, indicates that the legislature believed the holding of the First District
Court of Appeal of Florida correctly decided In re Estate of Smith²not the
Supreme Court holding that later quashed the First District.144 Therefore, this
showing of legislative intent opens up the opportunity for the Florida
Supreme Court to reverse its holding and adopt the opinion of the First
District, something the Third District failed to acknowledge in Rose v.
Sonson.
In its 1994 opinion, the First District Court of Appeal held in In re Estate
of Smith that the statute of limitations applicable to paternity proceedings to
establish support does not apply to actions to establish paternity for purposes
of intestacy.145 The court found multiple constitutional violations in that case,
holding that the application of section 95.11(3)(b) would (1) allow
preemption of a claim which never accrued, in violation of the state
constitution and intestate succession statutes; and (2) would treat similarly
situated illegitimate children, and similarly situated legitimate and
illegitimate children, disparately.146
First, the First District was correct in holding that applying section
95.11(3)(b) would allow preemption of a claim which never accrued, in
violation of the Florida Constitution and intestate succession statutes.147 Per
section 732.101(2) of the Florida Statutes, ³[t]he decedent¶s death is the event
that vests the heirs¶ right to the decedent¶s intestate property.´148 Simple logic
shows that application of the four-year statute of limitations beginning from
the age of majority allows a claim to be barred before it ever accrued. Chapter
95, which houses the statute of limitations, also states that ³the time within

141
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H.B. 599, 2009 H.R. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Smith, 640 So. 2d at 1155.
See generally id.
Id. at 1154±56.
Id. at 1155.
FLA. STAT. § 732.101(2) (2017).
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which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the
time the cause of action accrues.´149
By barring the claim before it accrued, the First District held, the
plaintiff¶s constitutional right of access to the courts was violated.150 The
statute of limitations was truly a statute of repose, allowing for discriminatory
results whenever illegitimate children were unable to discover the identities
of their fathers, or bring suit, before the age of twenty-two. As the Court noted
in Black that section 742.011 is ³intended solely to protect the rights of
illegitimate children,´ it should apply the same understanding to section
732.108(2)(b).151 Under the umbrella of such a policy, it is ³unlikely that the
Legislature intended to create a right in defendants to avoid their obligations´
by using the limitations imposed within the statute to their advantage.152
Also, the Court was correct in holding that application of the four-year
statute of limitations would treat similarly situated illegitimate children and
legitimate children, disparately.153 In its analysis the Court looked to a 1975
case, State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. West,154
which held the same statute of limitations unconstitutional as it related to
claims for support.155 There, the Court balanced the state¶s objective to avoid
stale claims against the impact of the statute upon illegitimates deprived of
their right to support.156 The First District in Smith noted that the holding in
West, striking the statute on equal protection grounds, was instructive to its
analysis.157
³Although proof of paternity may become more difficult with the
passage of time, this mere possibility cannot be allowed to work an
unconstitutional discrimination against illegitimate children.´158 Like West,
it should be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause to allow
legitimate offspring to have a claim accrue at the death of the father, while
forcing a child born out of wedlock to surrender such a claim before it ever
accrues. Further, in Black, the court discussed West and noted its
149

FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(b) (2017).
Smith, 640 So. 2d at 1155.
151 Black v. Nesmith, 475 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
152 Id.
153 ³As applied below, the statute also treats similarly situated illegitimate children with
disparity²for the child whose father dies during the child¶s minority, the right to seek inheritance is
always preserved; for the child who is twenty-two or older at her father¶s death, the right would never be
preserved.´ In re Estate of Smith, 640 So. 2d 1152, 1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
154 State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. West, 378 So. 2d 1220, 1222 (Fla.
1979).
155 Smith, 640 So. 2d at 1155.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
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acquiescence to the fact that ³[t]his holding operated to deprive West of a
defense which had clearly existed at the child¶s birth.´159 Florida must accept
the premise that ³illegitimate children are not µnonpersons.¶ They are
humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly µpersons¶ within the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.´160
West and Black illustrate that an unconstitutional application of section
95.11(3)(b) to bar a paternity complaint can be overcome despite the defense
the limitation provided the father, whether being applied to section 742.011
in West, or section 732.108(2)(b) in Rose, and future paternity actions
brought in probate proceedings.161 Therefore, if the Florida Supreme Court
overrules its decision In re Estate of Smith, and adopts the lower court¶s
holding that section 95.11(3)(b)¶s four-year statute of limitations was
unconstitutional, it cannot be said that all claims expired under that statute
are truly extinguished. Of course, retroactive application of a Supreme Court
holding would need some limitation to protect the state¶s valid interest in
avoiding stale claims, finality in final dispositions, and the orderly descent of
property. Such interests are not present for claimants such as Rose, where the
probate case is still happening and the claimant is imposing no additional
burden upon the state, court or estate of the decedent than any common
creditor would be. Retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision to
overrule In re Estate of Smith would be more than appropriate²it would be
equitable.
If the Supreme Court were to take up a case involving 732.108(b)(2)162,
the Court would accept that section 95.11(3)(b) never applied to determining
heirs in a probate proceeding for intestate inheritance. Such a holding would
allow claimants like Rose, and other similarly situated children born out of
wedlock, to assert their constitutional right of access to the courts by
petitioning their claims for intestate inheritance as putative children of the
deceased. In fact, the four-year statute of limitations can be considered
unconstitutional just as former section 731.29, which required written
acknowledgment of paternity by the father of the illegitimate child in order
for that child to inherit from the father via intestate succession, and violated
an illegitimate child¶s right to equal protection.163 Just as that statute was
discrimination veiled beneath a ³standard of proof´ justification in In re
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Black v. Nesmith, 475 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. West, 378 So. 2d 1220, 1222 (Fla.
1979) (quoting Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968)).
161 See generally Black, 475 So. 2d at 965.
162 The Court denied review of Rose v. Sonson on May 11, 2017.
163 In re Burris Estate, 361 So. 2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1978).
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Burris Estate, the four-year statute of limitations as applied to section
732.108(b)(2) is discrimination veiled beneath a stale claim justification.164
For example, imagine a girl born out of wedlock has a close relationship
with her putative father.165 The girl lives at least part time with the father and
grows up in the same home as her half brothers and sisters. For whatever
reason, the father never adopts the child, marries the mother, or
acknowledges the paternity in writing.166 She grows up, reaches majority,
goes to college, and makes a life. Her father becomes the grandfather of her
children, the father-in-law to her husband, etcetera. Eventually, the father
dies, without a will, so that his estate is to pass through intestate succession.
No doubt that because the daughter grew up with her father¶s other children,
and she maintained an open relationship with him throughout her life, the
other children and any other interested parties to the estate were on notice
that the girl was the daughter of the deceased and would make a claim on his
estate. In this instance, the ³stale claim´ justification of the four-year statute
of limitations from the time the daughter turned eighteen would simply be a
veil for discrimination against the daughter because the limitation would
operate just the same, whether the other interested parties were on notice or
not.
If a legitimate heir may claim inheritance in a probate proceeding, there
is no reason for a putative father¶s estate to be shielded by an unconstitutional
statute of limitations from an illegitimate heir¶s equally valid claim. Like In
re Burris Estate, such a statute does not serve the state¶s interest asserted in
Rose (avoiding stale claims or the due process rights of the defendants), but
instead creates an ³impenetrable barrier that works to shield invidious
discrimination.´167 By overruling In re Estate of Smith and adopting the First
District Court of Appeal¶s opinion, the Florida Supreme Court would be
applying the statute retroactively by noting the unconstitutionality of the
previous statute. The result would be that the claims were not extinguished
because the statute was void as applied to paternity claims in probate
proceedings for the purposes of intestate succession.
C. Provide A New Claim in Lieu of Reviving the Old One
As with any evolving area of the law, the arguments above are not
certain to succeed. The Florida Supreme Court is not as predictable as Jon
164

Id. at 155.
³More than 50% of all nonmarital children today are born to cohabiting couples.´ Solangel
Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA.
L. REV. 345, 356±57 (2011).
166 The ways paternity can be established under FLA. STAT. § 732.108(2) (2017).
167 Burris, 361 So. 2d at 155.
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Snow¶s vengeance,168 and it is wholly possible that the Court will decide not
to overrule In re Estate of Smith. The Court may distinguish Smith from a
case like Gammon v. Cobb or Black v. Nesmith and hold that even overruling
Smith would not have the same retroactive effect as those cases contemplated.
Also, if the Legislature acts to make the 2009 amendment retroactive, the
Court might hold the retroactive application unconstitutional, sticking with
the reasoning of Third District Court of Appeal¶s opinion in Rose.169
While such a decision would be wrong, it is not wholly out of the
purview of valid legal argument. Therefore, there is an alternative route that
could circumvent any roadblocks the Supreme Court could erect²amend
section 732.108(2)(b) to provide a new cause of action. Provide rather than
revive. If there is a political will to do so, the Florida Legislature could
provide for a new cause of action that would allow claimants currently barred
by the now inapplicable statute of limitations to once again assert their
constitutional right of access to the courts.
The First District Court of Appeal, perhaps by accident, has provided a
potential title to the new cause of action in its quashed opinion in In re Estate
of Smith²´The Action to Inherit.´170 For the sake of clarity, the title to the
amendment could be ³The Action for Children Born out of Wedlock to
Inherit.´ The proposed amendment should be entered as a subsection to
section 732.108(2)(b). The amended statute could read as follows, with the
added language in italics:
732.108. Adopted persons and persons born out of wedlock
(2) For the purpose of intestate succession in cases not
covered by subsection (1) . . . The person is also a
descendant of his or her father and is one of the natural
kindred of all members of the father¶s family, if:
(b) The paternity of the father is established by an
adjudication before or after the death of the father. Chapter
95 shall not apply in determining heirs in a probate
proceeding under this paragraph.
(A) Establishing paternity for the purpose of intestate
succession shall be a distinct cause of action from
168 Spoiler alert, most of Jon¶s family is murdered throughout Game of Thrones, and a group of
disloyal men turn on him.
169 Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct. 18, 2016), review
denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017). The Supreme Court denied review without
addressing the issue in May 2017.
170 ³The action to inherit is a distinct statutory cause of action, not within the contemplation of the
bar imposed by Section 95.11(3)(b).´ In re Estate of Smith, 640 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (emphasis added), aff’d, in part, rev’d, in part; see also In re Estate of Charles W. Smith; Dale S.
Wilson v. Shirley I. Scruggs; Dale S. Wilson, No. 84,385, 1995 WL 689549 (Fla. Nov. 22, 1995), opinion
withdrawn and superseded on reh¶g sub nom. In re Estate of Smith, 685 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1996).
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establishing paternity under section 742.10. This distinct
cause of action shall be known as The Action for Children
Born out of Wedlock to Inherit. However, if paternity is
established under section 742.10, then the right to inherit is
established, and the action established by this subsection
need not be brought.
(i) The Action for Children Born out of Wedlock to Inherit
shall accrue at the time of the putative father¶s death. Notice
of administration shall be published, and any child born out
of wedlock asserting a claim established by this subsection
shall assert their claim within the same time allowed to a
legitimate child to bring his/her claim for intestate
inheritance as an heir.
(ii) This section shall not be construed to create a cause of
action where an estate has been fully administered and
probate proceedings have been closed.
By creating this new cause of action, the Legislature can avoid any
constitutional issues that could arise from making the 2009 amendment
retroactive and can quickly provide a remedy to Rose and other similarly
situated Florida citizens, rather than wait for the Supreme Court to address
the issue. There are two issues that would need to be addressed with this new
amendment: (1) what statute of limitations, or time limit, if any, should apply
to this new cause of action; and (2) how should this new cause of action affect
children born out of wedlock who reached the age of majority before their
father died, when section 95.11(3)(b) was applicable, and the probate
proceedings have since been completed.
The answer to the second question is simple: the state¶s interest in
finality and the orderly descent of property is too strong to justify opening a
closed probate administration. If this limitation were not imposed, the courts
would be overrun with alleged heirs reopening probate administrations and
unsettling vested property interests. Such a result cannot be supported.
Rather, the intended purpose of the proposed amendment is to allow a
claimant to assert his or her status as child born out of wedlock when the
claimant would be imposing no additional burden upon the state, court, or
estate of the decedent than any other heir would be. Quite simply, this
proposed amendment would extend the application of the 2009 amendment
to section 732.108(2)(b) to the additional parties that the legislature
contemplated when it expressed its intention to overrule In re Estate of Smith
in its Staff Analysis.171
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The possible answers to the first question may be found in the statutes
and policies of other jurisdictions with similar statutes. With a goal of adding
no additional time burden to the administration process, one may analyze the
time limits imposed in Tennessee and New York. These states were chosen
because of the similarity their out of wedlock inheritance statutes hold with
section 732.108(3)(2) of the Florida Statutes, and because of their success in
achieving the intended goal of the amendment proposed above.
D. Comparative Analysis: Wisdom of Other States May Fill Florida’s
Legal Void
While the amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) is a step in the right
direction, its inability to provide a remedy for individuals like Stephen Rose,
coupled with its lack of clarity regarding the statute of limitations to apply in
paternity adjudication claims for intestate succession in the future, causes a
gap in the law that must be filled. Researching other states, Tennessee and
New York emerged to contain two of the statutory schemes most favorable
to individuals such as Rose, balancing the state¶s interest in the orderly
descent of property of its citizens, and the right for children born out of
wedlock to inherit like any other child.
1. Tennessee
Tennessee¶s out of wedlock inheritance laws are similar to Florida¶s, but
the statute of limitations is not.172 Under Tennessee law, ³for purposes of
intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be established to
determine succession by . . . an adjudication before the death of the father or
. . . thereafter by clear and convincing proof.´173 Tennessee allows a paternity
claim to be brought up until a creditor claim can be brought, essentially
treating illegitimate children and creditors with the same status for purposes
of timeliness of claims.174 Previously, Tennessee had a ten-year statute of
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See Lanier v. Rains, 229 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tenn. 2007).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105 (2017).
174 Bilbrey v. Smithers, 937 S.W.2d 803, 808 (Tenn. 1996) (³[A] child born out of wedlock, whose
paternity is not adjudicated prior to the death of the father, can establish the right to inherit by intestate
succession by asserting that right against the estate of the deceased owner of the property in which an
interest is claimed within the time allowed for creditors to file claims against the estate and by establishing
paternity by clear and convincing proof.´); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2017); ³If a
child born out of wedlock asserts his status as a child of a decedent and a corresponding right to inherit
by intestate succession within the time allowed for creditors to file claims against the decedent¶s estate,
the claim will not be barred by any statutory limitations period.´ Lanier, 229 S.W.3d at 662.
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limitations, which could run prior to the death of the father.175 However, the
court said in Thompson v. Coates that the statute of limitations would not
apply because if the ten-year period ran before the father¶s death, the child
would be barred from bringing suit to establish his share of the estate, even
though the statute specifically allows suit to be brought after the death of the
father.176
Section 732.108(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes also clearly established
that the paternity of the father may be established ³by an adjudication before
or after the death of the father.´177 Using the same reasoning as Thompson,
one finds that allowing the alleged heir¶s claim to extinguish before the
father¶s death is in contravention to Florida¶s policy of allowing children to
prove paternity for the purpose of intestate succession after the father¶s death.
Florida should consider a policy like Tennessee¶s for several reasons. Such a
standard provides a well-defined rule, notice to claimants, guarantees an
opportunity to prove paternity after death, protects the rights of creditors and
future owners of the estate¶s property, and creates no additional restrictions
on rights of inheritance than what already exists (such as creditors, taxing
authorities, and legitimate children).178 Although the creditor time limit may
seem arbitrary, the Court in Tennessee was able to justify this decision:
While conceding that its decision was ³somewhat arbitrary,´
the Court explained that it chose this limitations period
because (1) it could be implemented by reference to familiar
and well defined rules, (2) it provided the constitutionally
mandated notice to claimants, (3) it protected the rights of
creditors and subsequent property owners, (4) it posed no
threat to ³rights of inheritance´ beyond those already posed
by creditors and taxing authorities, and (5) it retained the
current degree of dependability in the titles to intestate
property.179
In Glanton v. Lord, cousins filed separate actions seeking sale and
partition of real property previously owned by their deceased uncle and
grandfather, and determination of inheritance rights of the decedents¶
putative heirs.180 The cousins argued, inter alia, that because their uncle had
been dead for forty years, and the putative children had not made their claim

175 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3-110, 31-206; see Thompson v. Coates, 627 S.W.2d 376, 380
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
176 Thompson, 627 S.W.2d at 380.
177 FLA. STAT. § 732.108(2)(b) (2017) (emphasis added).
178 Bilbrey, 937 S.W.2d at 808.
179 Glanton v. Lord, 183 S.W.3d 391, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
180 Id. at 394.
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within the ten-year catch-all statute of limitations, they were barred from
claiming inheritance.181 The Court of Appeals of Tennessee disagreed,
holding that even if the statute of limitations applied to claims for inheritance
by children born out of wedlock, ³[t]he statutes of limitation applicable to
creditors¶ claims²and thus to a non-marital child¶s claim of paternity and a
corresponding right to inherit by intestate succession²does not begin to run
until after a decedent¶s estate is submitted to probate and a statutory Notice
to Creditors is published.´182 Because the decedent¶s estate was never
submitted to probate, the limitations period had not begun to run, and the
claim of the putative children was timely.183
Florida should adopt the same understanding of its statute defining the
rights of children born out of wedlock to inherit through intestate succession.
The rights of potential heirs should not vest until after certain conditions are
met, including the satisfaction of valid claims of creditors. Providing children
born out of wedlock the same access to intestate succession puts no additional
time burden on other parties interested in the administration of the estate.
Therefore, allowing the right to assert a claim for inheritance through
paternity to expire prior to the death of the putative father, or before the
probate administration has been opened, would be in contravention of the
statutory purpose indicated by the Florida Legislature and Supreme Court, as
was held in Tennessee.184
2. New York
New York is also very forgiving, removing time limits for bringing the
inheritance claim, but including limitation on which children born out of
wedlock have standing to bring the claim.185 Although the statute defining
the right of nonmarital children to inherit from their fathers is somewhat
different than Florida¶s section 732.108(2)(b), its application by the courts is
telling of how the policy of the statute is important in the interpretation of the
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Id.
Id. at 400.
183 Id. at 398.
184 Thus, the imposition of such a requirement would, in many cases, essentially undermine the
statutory command that non-marital children be allowed to inherit by intestate succession from or
through their biological father if paternity is established by an adjudication before the father¶s death
³or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof.´
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31±2±105(a)(2)(B). We do not believe the Tennessee Supreme Court intended such
a result with its decision in Bilbrey v. Smithers.
Glanton, 183 S.W.3d at 399 (emphasis added).
185 N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 4-1.2.
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statute.186 In New York, ³[t]here is no time limitation for the establishment
of paternity.´187
If a non-marital child discovers belatedly that her father has died, she
can seek an accounting if the statute of limitations has not run.188 The statute
of limitations begins to run when the fiduciary openly repudiates his fiduciary
obligations.189 However, not every non-marital child in New York can assert
their claim of paternity for purposes of intestate succession: ³The language
of Section 4-1.2(a)(2)(C) states that a nonmarital child can inherit from a
biological father¶s estate if µpaternity has been established by clear and
convincing evidence and the father of the child has openly and notoriously
acknowledged the child as his own.¶´190 Thus, in New York, a nonmarital
child cannot become an heir to the estate of the putative father the child did
not know.191
Originally, New York case law said that ³genetic testing must be
administered during a putative father¶s lifetime for the results to be
admissible to establish paternity in an heirship proceeding.´192 However, in
2006, the court in In re Davis said that genetic testing to prove paternity after
death was allowed so long as there was an open and notorious
acknowledgement of paternity.193
Florida policy makers, if they so choose, could limit the potential pool
of children born out of wedlock who could inherit through intestacy, like
New York. Instead of an arbitrary cutoff date calculated from the age of
majority, or even the age of death, such a rule as New York has is rationally
related to the intended purpose of the orderly descent of its citizens¶ property.
By limiting the pool of possible claimants to those children who were at least
acknowledged by the father during life, other interested parties are placed on
notice, and the time for administration need not be unduly delayed while
claims of putative children are found and argued. Although this author does

186 See Matter of Williams, 609 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (refusing to allow the
doctrine of laches to be asserted as a defense against claim to be included as distribute under this section).
187 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (Practice Commentaries).
188 See Matter of Barabash, 286 N.Y.2d 268, 269±70, 272 (1972) (decedent¶s issue entitled to
accounting twenty years after his death because administrator had not repudiated his fiduciary duties); In
re Estates of Cipriani, 889 N.Y.S.2d 881, *2 (Sur. 2009) (non-marital child learned of her father¶s death
ten years after he had died; and court ordered accounting).
189 See Cipriani, 889 N.Y.S.2d at *4.
190 Pandelton, supra note 88, at 2856; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C)
(McKinney 2010 (2007)).
191 Pandelton, supra note 88, at 2856.
192 Id. at 2855.
193 In re Davis, 812 N.Y.S.2d 543, 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).

158

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 13:127

not see a need for a limitation such as New York has implemented, there is
no arguing against its pragmatism.194
III. CONCLUSION
Like fictional fifteenth century Jon Snow, children born out of wedlock
in the twenty-first century continue to face laws that discriminate against
them for decisions they played no part in. Florida¶s Third District Court of
Appeal¶s holding in Rose v. Sonson creates an inequitable result for children
born out of wedlock, now twenty-nine years or older, who seek to establish
paternity for the purpose of intestate succession after their fathers pass
away.195 By ignoring the Legislature¶s intention, as expressed by its Staff
Analysis, to overrule the decision of In re Estate of Smith, the court allowed
an unconstitutional statute of limitations to continue to apply to a substantial
portion of Florida¶s population.196 Smith incorrectly applied section
95.11(3)(b) to section 732.108(2)(b) so that a child born out of wedlock only
had four years from the age of majority to assert a paternity claim. 197 If the
child waited until the death of the putative father, more than four years after
attaining the age of majority, to bring the claim, then the child was barred
from bringing his or her claim. This decision in Smith was in contravention
of the express language of section 732.108(2)(b) that says the claim for
paternity can be brought after death with clear and convincing evidence.198
Although the Florida Legislature finally acted in 2009 to fix this conflict

194 Id. at 546±47 (quoting Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 271 (1978)) (³With respect to the rights of
nonmarital children, the State has an interest in minimizing µthe potential for disruption of estate
administration¶ . . . which would not be served by indiscriminate posthumous DNA testing. Although
technical advances in genetic testing have obviated difficulties in proving paternity and rendered such
proof reliable and accurate in most cases, procedural difficulties remain. In the absence of an open and
notorious acknowledgment of paternity by the decedent, persons unknown to the decedent and/or his or
her personal representative potentially could have rights in an estate.´).
195 Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct. 18, 2016), review
denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017).
196 This bill overrules the holding in In re Estate v. Smith and provides that ch. 95, F.S., does not
apply in determining heirs in a probate proceeding. Therefore, this bill allows for a determination of
paternity to be made in a probate proceeding for the purpose of proving heirship, even if it is more
than four years after the date the child reaches majority. This change is limited to intestate
succession.
FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CIVIL JUSTICE & COURTS POLICY, STAFF ANALYSIS OF HB 599, at 3 (2009).
197 See In re Estate of Smith, 685 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 1996); (³Actions other than for recovery
of real property shall be commenced as follows: . . . (3) Within four years.² . . . (b) An action relating to
the determination of paternity, with the time running from the date the child reaches the age of majority.´)
FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(b) (2017).
198 FLA. STAT. § 732.108(2)(b) (2017).
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between precedent and policy, the amendment was not applied
retroactively.199
If the legislature can legally act to expressly make the statute retroactive,
it should. However, it may be impossible to affect a result other than what
Rose implies²that anyone twenty-nine years old or older in 2016 is barred
from paternity claims in probate court, because of the possibility that
retroactive application is not allowed due to its effect on the rights of
decedents¶ estates and representatives to protect their property interests with
the statute of limitation.200 Although there are cases interpreting other statutes
(and similar statutes in other jurisdictions), showing that the statute of
limitation has not created a fully vested right in other interested parties, such
as heirs, and that the rights of those negatively affected by the change in the
statute of limitations are not as strong as those who are losing their claim
because of the limitation,201 the Court has not adopted that view for cases
under section 732.108(2)(b). For now, Florida would likely see this as a
violation of due process for the party losing the statute of limitations as a
defense, rather than a violation of due process and equal protection by
extinguishing a nonmarital child¶s claim before it accrued, or treating the
nonmarital child differently than similarly situated legitimate children.202
If the Legislature cannot make the statute retroactive, the Florida
Supreme Court may choose to overrule In re Estate of Smith. While the Court
cannot make the amendment retroactive without an express intent to do so by
the legislature, it can look to the legislative history of the amendment to see
an intention to overrule Smith²the seminal case applying the four-year
statute of limitations on adjudications of paternity in probate proceedings for
intestate succession. By heeding the legislature¶s intention and revisiting
Smith, the Court can overrule the decision and adopt the lower court¶s
holding that application of the limitation would be unconstitutional by
infringing on the right to access to the courts and equal protection by
preempting a claim which has not accrued, and treating children born out of
wedlock differently from legitimate children without proper justification.
With the precedent of Smith reversed, the 2009 amendment will apply
retroactively, in a sense, by allowing claimants such as Rose to bring their
claims. However, the state¶s interest would still be served because the
amendment would not revive claims on estates that have already been fully
administered.
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See generally Rose v. Sonson, 208 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh¶g denied (Oct.
18, 2016), review denied, SC16-2083, 2017 WL 1954982 (Fla. May 11, 2017).
201 See, e.g., Black v. Nesmith, 475 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
202 See generally In re Estate of Smith, 685 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1996).
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If the Legislature cannot make the amendment retroactive, and the
Supreme Court will not overrule precedent that applied the statute of
limitations in the first place, then the Legislature could choose to supply a
new claim²The Action for Children Born out of Wedlock to Inherit. By
providing a new claim, the Legislature would be able to act quickly instead
of waiting for the Supreme Court to take up the issue (if it ever does) and
avoid the potential unconstitutionality of an amendment for retroactive
application. The amendment would not apply to nonmarital children whose
fathers¶ estates have already been administered and closed before the
enactment of the amendment, thus protecting the state¶s interest in finality,
avoiding stale claims, and protecting vested property interests.
The proposed amendment would have to address the issue of what time
frame, if any, should apply to the new cause of action. Based on analysis of
states with intestacy and out of wedlock statutes that effectively meet the goal
of adding no additional time burden to the administration process while
protecting the interests of children born out of wedlock, Tennessee and New
York each supply guidance for what time limitations should be imposed on
this new cause of action. Ultimately, the applicable time limitation should
provide a well-defined rule, notice to claimants, guarantee an opportunity to
prove paternity after death, protect the rights of creditors and future owners
of the estate¶s property, and create no additional restrictions on rights of
inheritance than what already exist (such as creditors, taxing authorities, and
legitimate children). Tennessee¶s system does best to achieve these goals by
forcing nonmarital children to bring a claim within the time allowed for
creditors to file claims against the decedent¶s estate.203
However Florida chooses to proceed, policy makers and the judiciary
must recognize the history of discrimination against children born out of
wedlock²from Jon Snow to Stephen Rose. Equal protection and due process
must be afforded to nonmarital children, who should not suffer for the socalled sins of their fathers. The time has come to end disproportionate
treatment toward out of wedlock children in Florida¶s probate system.
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